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This paper links economic development to age-old family characteristics through the propensity to invest and 
thus increase human productivity. Inequality among siblings favors investment in physical capital, while a high 
status of women and strong parental authority favor investment in human capital. To test this theory, a family 
score is built according to the presence of these three characteristics in the traditional family type of each 
country. This family score as well as basic family characteristics are significantly associated with better economic 
outcomes (GDP per capita as well as proxies for investment in human and physical capital). These relationships 
are robust to other factors already identified as playing a role, such as geography, ethnic fractionalization, 
genetic diversity, religion, and formal institutions. Reverse causality is rejected by both historical anthropology 
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The explanation of the large differences in economic development between human 
communities remains a fundamental economic issue. Williamson (2000) highlighted the crucial 
role of informal institutions. This paper explores the role of the first and most common 
institution arranging relationships among humans: the family. The family institution arranges 
the relations between wife and husband (high or low status for women), parents and children 
(parental authority or freedom of children) and among siblings (equality or inequality).  
Observed arrangements between family members vary significantly across human 
communities. Contrary to common belief, families in the past were not systematically an 
association of several generations and siblings. For instance, the traditional English family 
has been Nuclear (consisting only of parents with non-adult children) since at least the 13th 
century (Laslett et al., 1972). But traditional families in Japan or Russia for example 
exhibited a more frequent association of several generations in the same household. 
Anthropologists study the organizations of families across the world by identifying 
characteristics which, when combined, lead to a specific family type. Following Le Play 
(1884), the work of Todd (1984, 2011) offers a classification based on thousands of 
anthropological studies, for almost all countries. Moreover, his book of 1984 (English version 
in 1987) assumed two theoretical relationships between family characteristics and economic 
development. He claims that increase in literacy occurs earlier in countries characterized by 
a high status of women and strong authority of parents over children. 
We use this framework to propose three theoretical relationships between family 
characteristics and the propensity to invest. A family type characterized by a high status of 
women leads to a higher investment in human capital, as mothers play a key role in educating 
the next generation. A similar higher investment in human capital is achieved in a family 
type characterized by strong parental authority over children, because this authority also 
helps the transmission of human capital. These two causal links were already implicitly 
assumed by Todd (1984).  
We assume a third relationship: the potential inequality of siblings favors investment in 
physical capital. This theoretical effect is supported by two mechanisms. First, inequality in 
inheritance maintains assets of a critical size for enabling investment, whereas strict equality 
leads to division into portions that are too small to invest. Second, investment allocation is 
more efficient because it is not biased by the need to transmit equal shares of wealth. Parents 
can concentrate their investments in non-divisible assets and help one child to invest in a 
project without any consideration of the need to transmit equal shares. These different 
propensities to invest, in both human and physical capital, according to family characteristics 
lead to different levels of productivity, which is the fundamental explanation of the differences 
in economic development. 
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Using Todd’s classifications (1984, 2011), we document for each country the three family 
characteristics that are assumed to be relevant for explaining economic development. As all 
family arrangements around the world deal with these three issues, it is easy to determine 
whether a given characteristic is present. We build dummy series for each of them, namely 
relatively high status of women, strong parental authority and potential inequality among 
siblings. We then sum these three series to build a fourth, the ‘family score’, whose values 
vary from 0 to 3 according to whether 0, 1, 2 or 3 of these characteristics are present in the 
family type of a given country.  
As predicted by this theory, these four series are highly correlated (with the expected positive 
sign) with the current GDP per capita in a cross-country analysis. We control for geographical 
variables known to be associated with economic development (percentage of arable land, land 
suitability for agriculture, absolute latitude, percentage of population at risk at contracting 
malaria, percentage of population living in tropical areas, distance from waterways, continent 
dummies, OPEC membership, Neolithic timing and geographical isolation). We then add 
variables controlling for the characteristics of people living in a given country (ethnic 
fractionalization, genetic diversity and the percentage of the population of European descent). 
Family series remain highly significant when using these controls either independently or all 
together. We also run a robustness check to exclude from the dataset those countries in which 
several family types are observed; when there were several family types in a given country, 
we used the dominant one.  
Analysis of their effect channels shows that each of the three family characteristics contributes 
significantly to explaining GDP per capita when tested together, which implies that each of 
them plays a specific role. We confirm the respective roles of each characteristic. Both high 
status of women and strong parental authority are associated with higher investment in 
human capital (proxied by number of scientific articles per capita and number of years of 
schooling). Inequality of siblings is associated with a higher level of investment in physical 
capital as measured in public accounting across countries. 
Since religions provide rules about how a family should be arranged, one might ask whether 
family type differs from religious affiliation. The narrative suggested here shows that there 
are actually three cases of relationships between religion and family structure: i) 
independence, ii) religion influences the family type and iii) existing family type influences 
the development of religions. Moreover, our results remain robust when controlling for 
religious affiliation in each country. 
Another issue investigated here concerns formal institutions as a potential alternative channel 
of the effects of family characteristics on economic development. We point out the effect of 
family characteristics on the propensity to invest, but another (non-exclusive) channel could 
also operate if the formal institutions are influenced by the family structures. To test this 
potential alternative channel, we add to our regressions an index to measure the quality of 
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institutions. Coefficients on our family series decrease but remain highly significant, so a 
direct effect of family characteristics cannot be rejected. A similar process rejects a potential 
channel through the legal regime since, for countries where the existing legal regime was not 
imposed, we may assume that family types had an impact. Finally, our results also remain 
robust to the control for state history.  
A last concern comes from potential reverse causality, in which case economic development 
would lead to specific family types. Both historical anthropology and an instrumental 
investigation reject this hypothesis. For most countries, the family type documented in this 
paper has been the same for centuries. Besides, the best family types for current economic 
development appear to be the most primitive. These archaic family types benefitted from a 
reversal of fortune. Most innovations (technologies, formal institutions) were initially 
developed in the Fertile Crescent and China before spreading across Eurasia. According to 
Todd (2011), the same is true for the family model as an informal institution. We thus assume 
that family innovations spread within Eurasia by contagion. Consequently, the greater the 
distance from the two centers of innovation (the Fertile Crescent and China), the more archaic 
the family arrangement (reflected in a higher family score). We thus use the distance from 
innovation centers as an instrument for the family score. This instrumented family score 
appears to be highly significant in explaining GDP per capita. The direction of the causality 
is thus, without any doubt, from family characteristics to economic development. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related literature is detailed in (II) before 
a presentation of the theoretical links between the three family characteristics and the 
propensity to invest in (III). The data we used are explained in (IV) and the distribution of 
the family characteristics around the world is illustrated in (V). Section (VI) contains our 
empirical tests of these theoretical links. The channels of these effects are more specifically 
explored in (VII). Section (VIII) deals with controls performed to detect alternative channels 
though religion and formal institutions. The potential reverse causality is rejected in (IX) on 
the basis of both anthropological evidence and an instrumental test. The last section 
concludes. 
 
II. RELATED LITERATURE 
Interest in the link between family and economics is by no means new. Adam Smith and 
Alfred Marshall used family structure to help explain disparities in economic development (in 
Scott Smith, 1993: 7). Banfield (1958) used the term “amoral family” to describe the social 
and cultural environment that was shaping individual decisions in a small village in the south 
of Italy. More recent literature analyzed the link between marriage and economic outcomes 
(e.g. Jacoby, 1995; Tertilt, 2005).  
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Todd (1983, 1984) identified different consequences of family types on economic and social 
outcomes.1 For example, Todd (1983) argues that certain family structures tend to result in 
different forms of government since formal institutions mirror family type. For instance, all 
countries where communism took power without foreign intervention (Russia, China, 
Yugoslavia and Cuba) were not characterized by an important proletarian class but by the 
same family type (called Communitarian), where brothers have equal status and remain under 
the authority of their father. Another relationship proposed by Todd (1983) is that democratic 
regimes are associated with the Nuclear family; Dilli (2015) confirms this relationship. 
Following the seminal works of Todd, several authors link traditional family types to socio-
economic outcomes currently observed. Mamadouh (1999) uses Todd’s data to explain the 
difference in political culture within Europe. Dilli et al. (2013) show that long-lasting 
institutions, especially family types, are important explanations of current variations in 
gender equality. Bertocchi and Bozzano (2014) identify family structure as a key factor of the 
gender education gap in Italy in the late 19th century. Tur-Prats (2019) identifies the Stem 
family (see below) as causing lower domestic violence today in Spain. Diebolt et al. (2016) 
and de la Croix and Perrin (2016) stressed the significant effect of family types on fertility 
rate and school enrollment in 19th century France. 
As in our paper, other research focuses more on economic consequences. De Vries (2008) 
stressed the role of the Nuclear family in the economic development of northern Europe. 
Algan and Cahuc (2005) showed that family culture is responsible for cross-country 
heterogeneity in employment rates in Europe. Duranton et al. (2009) used Todd’s family 
types to explain regional differences in economic outcomes across Europe such as household 
size, educational attainment, social capital, labor force participation, sectorial structure, 
wealth, and inequality. Kick et al. (2000) investigate the link between family and economic 
growth. The main idea of the latter paper is close to ours since the authors look for economic 
growth as consequences of family characteristics, even though they study rather different 
family variables (e.g. marriage rate, illegitimate births). 
An important stream of research using family as an explanatory variable focuses on the 
difference between Nuclear versus large kinship families as leading to different forms of 
cooperation. Greif (2006) identified the European family organization as being at the origin 
of the large non-familial organizations such as the state and large firms. Greif and Tabellini 
(2010) stress the clan and the city as two different ways of sustaining cooperation in China 
and Europe. Schulz et al. (2019) point out the impact of Catholic family doctrine on the 
development of specific traits, especially individualism.  
Numerous studies demonstrate different consequences of the strength of family ties. Alger 
and Weibull (2010) develop a model explaining the strength of family ties by the ecological 
environment; a hostile environment leads to weak family ties. Alesina and Giuliano (2010) 
 
1 Following Todd, we use family, type, structure, form and model indistinguishably to describe the same reality. 
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show that strong family ties imply more reliance on the family (which provides goods and 
services) and less on the market and on the government. Alesina and Giuliano (2011) establish 
an inverse relationship between family ties and political participation, as family and political 
institutions provide similar kinds of services. Galasso and Profeta (2010) demonstrate that 
family type influences the design of pension systems in different countries. 
Other studies refer to the European Marriage Pattern (EMP). In the 1960s, Hajnal identified 
a specific marriage pattern west of a line between St Petersburg and Trieste, characterized 
by high female age at marriage, a high percentage of singles and the Nuclear family. Several 
studies attribute to EMP a crucial role in explaining the economic success of western Europe 
(especially England) compared to the rest of the world (e.g. Voigtlander and Voth, 2006; de 
Moor and van Zanden, 2009; Foreman-Peck, 2011). Dennison and Ogilvie (2014), however, 
pointed out that the concept of EMP remains unclear, while emphasizing the diverging views 
about the timing of the emergence of the EMP, the geographical area concerned, and the 
mechanisms favorable to growth supported by the EMP.  
Recent studies agree that there were greater variations within Western Europe, especially 
frequent non-nuclear households (Stem and Communitarian families), than in Hajnal’s 
original view. Moreover, several areas on the edges of Asia do exhibit similar characteristics 
(Todd, 2011). Carmichael and van Zanden (2015) proposed a “Girlpower version” of the EMP 
characterized by Nuclear family, monogamy, exogamy, and a relatively strong position of 
women in marriage (no arranged marriages). Carmichael et al. (2015b) built an index for the 
“Girlpower version” of the EMP, demonstrating a close relationship between their version 
and economic development in modern Europe. Carmichael et al. (2019) extend this analysis 
to Eurasia using family characteristics to build a female-friendliness index that they 
instrument by the distance from China, North India and Iraq to explain current GDP per 
capita. Carmichael et al. (2019) rely on similar intuitions, data and methods to those of our 
investigation but focusing on the effect of the family system on female agency.  
In this paper, we add to this literature by focusing on basic family characteristics rather than 
family types (types are specific combinations of family characteristics) and by looking for an 
effect on worldwide comparative economic development through three theoretical links 
between family characteristics and investment in both human and physical capital. 
 
III. A THEORY OF THE FAMILY ORIGIN OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The living standard of a given country depends on human productivity (Gordon, 2016) which 
depends in turn on investment in both physical and human capital. The role of investment 
in physical capital in economic growth has long been demonstrated and formalized, by Solow 
(1956). The importance of human capital formation has been underlined for instance in the 
Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2011). There is as yet no firm consensus explaining the 
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divergence between countries regarding the amount invested in both kinds of capital. Family 
characteristics offer an answer; Family characteristics → Propensity to invest → Economic 
development. 
The family structure of a given population evolves very slowly over time as shown in different 
ways by Alesina and Giuliano (2010), Reher (1998) and Todd (2011).2 We assume that 
traditional (for a few centuries) family characteristics still exist, “transmitted from generation 
to generation and they have persisted through history to the present day” (Alesina and 
Giuliano, 2014) and influence current human behavior. 
 
A. Strong parental authority increases investment in human capital 
Family types differ in how parents and children interact. In several types, parents, or at least 
the father, exert strong authority over children. Children remain subject to their parents’ 
authority long after reaching adulthood and even after marrying. In some cases, the new 
couple lives in the house of the parents and under their authority until they inherit it. When 
they produce their own children, three generations cohabit (parents, children and 
grandchildren). This cohabitation leads to complex households with more than one couple 
living together. 
This authority allows the parents to invest in the human capital of their children more 
intensively and for a longer period compared to family structures where children become 
independent earlier. The importance of such investment is stressed by Henrich (2016). 
Moreover, when three generations are living together, the grandparents are also likely to 
complement the parents’ transmission of human capital.3 The cohabitation with the new 
couple provides an incentive for parents, even non-altruistically, to invest in their heirs as 
human capital because they profit directly from the extra income this investment generates 
for the extended household. Conversely, in family types not characterized by this strong 
parental authority, children become independent early with looser ties with their parents; as 






2 For a discussion on the intergenerational transmission of values from parents to children through institutions 
and beliefs, see Bisin and Verdier (2000) and Guiso et al. (2006). 
3 Carmichael et al. (2017) find a positive effect of having a grandparent in a household; in the 19th century this 
increased the chance of a child attending school.  
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B. High status of women increases investment in human capital 
According to family type, women can enjoy a more or less equal role in the family compared 
to men. In some family types, the father is the sole head of the family, with both children 
and wife being under his authority (patriarchy). In other family types, women enjoy more 
equal (or, rarely, higher) status. 
High status of women has a positive impact on investment in human capital because the 
mother plays a key role in the education of the children, and thus in the formation of the 
next generation’s human capital.4 In family types where women enjoy relatively high status, 
they are themselves likely to accumulate more human capital and thus to invest more easily 
in the human capital of their children. This high status also allows a woman to choose to 
marry later, after a longer period increasing her own human capital before becoming a mother 
and being able to help with this investment. Moreover, this investment is concentrated in a 
more limited number of children due to the reduced period of marital fertility. The potential 
late age at marriage (and thus procreation) allowed by high status of women favors quality 
in the trade-off between quantity and quality of children (Becker, 1992).5 
  
C. Inequality among siblings increases investment in physical capital 
Despite not using the term human capital, Todd (1984) already assumes the positive impact 
of strong parental authority and high status of women on economic development. We add 
inequality among siblings as a third family characteristic with a theoretical positive impact 
on development, but through investment in physical capital. In an equal family system, all 
the brothers, and sometimes the sisters, obtain similar rights, especially in terms of 
inheritance. In inegalitarian systems, parents can favor one particular child (often the eldest) 
at the expense of the others. 
Potential inequality among siblings has a positive impact on investment in physical capital 
for two reasons. The first is the attainment of a critical size of wealth capable of supporting 
investments.6 Inequality allows this critical size whereas a strictly equal inheritance would 
lead to a higher number of properties too small to allow investment. Second, the quality of 
the asset allocation is better, enabling both parents and favored children to grasp 
opportunities at any point in time. Parents can choose to concentrate their wealth in a specific 
asset that is difficult to share. Parents can also choose to finance the project of one child 
 
4 This channel operates in the theoretical model of Diebolt and Perrin (2013). 
5 In family systems characterized by low status of women, the marriage age remains low whatever the economic 
conditions. 
6 Kuran (2011) points out that under Islamic rule sharing inheritance among a large kinship makes it difficult 
to keep successful businesses intact across generations and does not allow capital accumulation. 
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during their lifetime, without the constraint of needing to maintain equality. Conversely, in 
family systems characterized by equality, investments are biased toward easily fractionable 




To characterize family characteristics of countries, we use the classifications of Todd (1984, 
2011). Todd went through a very large number (about 70 pages of references are cited in his 
2011 book) of anthropological, statistical, historical, archeological and legal studies about 
families around the world. He cross-references his observations to demonstrate his claims 
about family types. His main sources are anthropological data on rural areas before the 
emergence of modernity. Rural areas were chosen because the family characteristics can 
manifest themselves more easily, being free of urban constraints, and the pre-modern period 
because with the development of state redistribution, especially the welfare state, the nature 
of family relationships has become more difficult to observe, even while continuing to exist in 
a less visible form. 
Todd’s data were partially used by Duranton et al. (2009), Alesina and Giuliano (2014), Dilli 
et al. (2013), Bertocchi and Bozzano (2014) and Galasso and Profeta (2010). The latter shows 
the consistency of Todd’s classification of family structure with the data used by Alesina and 
Giuliano (2010) taken from three questions of the World Value Survey. Todd’s data are also 
consistent with the anthropological classification of Murdock (1969) and come out favorably 
when trying to solve discrepancies between the two datasets, according to a careful 
comparison undertaken by Rijpma and Carmichael (2016). 
To identify family type characterized by strong parental authority, Todd looks at the 
statistical prevalence of complex households (cohabitation between three generations). Even 
in a theoretical world where cohabitation is assumed to be systematic, the prevalence of three-
generation households is capped due to infertility, material constraints, deaths and other life 
accidents. But census data enable the easy identification of countries where such cohabitation 
is frequent compared to others where it is exceptional. Equality among siblings is assessed 
using data on inheritance laws and practices. Inheritance can be strictly egalitarian, strictly 
inegalitarian (e.g. primogeniture) or can permit inequality (e.g. freedom to testate at will). In 
the two last cases, family systems are called inegalitarian.  
To assess the status of women, Todd uses two indicators: equality in inheritance, and choice 
of location when a new household is set up. First, rules and practices of inheritance can 
transmit assets through males (patrilineal), females (matrilineal) or both (bilateral). In the 
last two forms of transmission, women enjoy higher status than in patrilineal families. Second, 
when the status of the women is low, the new household systematically settles close to the 
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family of the husband (i.e. the woman moves to where her husband’s family is located, which 
is called patrilocal); or even into the family of her husband if the model is also characterized 
by authority (cohabitation of generations). When the status of women is high, the new 
household settles indifferently close to the parents of the wife or of the husband (bilocal) or 
in few cases systematically close to the family of the wife (matrilocal). 
Combinations of different characteristics define a family type according to Todd’s 
classification. His initial classification distinguished four main family types, but fifteen were 
used in his most recent book (Todd, 2011). Whatever the number of family types developed, 
it is always possible to identify the presence of the three basic family characteristics we focus 
on. We build three dummy series each with a value 1 when the family structure of a given 
country is characterized by strong parental authority, high status of women and potential 
inequality among siblings. These three series are used alone and also combined in a fourth 
series called ‘Family score’ as the sum of these three basic series. The family score is thus 
comprised between 0 and 3. For a few countries, Todd does not provide any data; we therefore 
exclude these cases (mainly Oceania Islands). For countries where several family types are 
observed (India, Italy, USA, etc.), we retain the characteristics of the dominant type for the 
whole country.7  
Most of the other data are from Ashraf and Galor (2013). We retain this data set since it has 
been compiled for a recent decisive paper in the field using numerous control variables. Details 
of this dataset are available in Ashraf and Galor (2013). The main explained variable, income 
per capita in each country in 2000, is taken from the Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2006). 
 
V. DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS THE WORLD 
We describe a few of the most salient distributions of these family characteristics around 
the world.   
 
A. Strong parental authority 
Authority is a feature of Germanic, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean families, for 
example, but they differ regarding inequality among siblings. Authority in German, Korean 
and Japanese families is associated with potential inequality among siblings (combination 
called the Stem type) whereas Russian and Chinese families, for instance, require perfect 
equality (combination called the Communitarian type). But in both cases, parents can invest 
in next generation human capital more intensively and for a longer period. In the 
Communitarian type, all the sons are allowed to marry and bring their spouses into the 
parental household. This leads to large families splitting when the sustainable size is exceeded. 
 
7 In section VI, we offer a control for this simplification. 
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In the Stem type, only one heir is allowed to marry and bring his wife (or sometimes husband) 
into the parental household while other siblings can remain in the parental home but only 
while single. Parental authority is a frequent characteristic where the new couple needs to 
share the produce of the family farm to make a living.  
In family types that are not characterized by authority, such as in Anglo-Saxon countries, 
children enjoy more freedom. Children leave early to settle in a new household and remain 
more independent from their parents. In the traditional English family for example, the 
children were able to set up their own household easily because of the availability of farm 
jobs due to the dominance of large farms owned by a few wealthy landowners. This led to an 
early labor market which could not exist in areas where agriculture is carried on by small 
family farms without any employees. These weak ties between parents and children in the 
traditional English family also led to early problems of rural poverty mainly involving old 
people (isolated from their children), which explains the precocity of the Poor Laws in 
England relative to other comparable countries (de Moor and van Zanden, 2009).  
 
 
FIGURE I. STRONG AUTHORITY OF PARENTS OVER CHILDREN 
Note: This figure shows the countries (in black) where family type is characterized by strong authority of 
parents over children 
 
In most of the Muslim countries, the family is not characterized by strong parental authority 
despite being clanic. This is due to the endogamy of the “Arab marriage”. This is a preference 
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for marriage between first cousins, if possible, the children of two brothers. Since the day of 
her birth, it is assumed that a girl will marry her older cousin. In many customs, the cousin 
enjoys a kind of right to his female cousin (Chelhod, 1965). Today, the rate of marriage 
between first cousins, close to zero in a large part of the world is, according to Weinreb 
(2008), between 23% in Algeria and above 50% in countries such as Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, 
and Saudi Arabia. As a consequence of these rates, and adding marriages with more distant 
cousins, almost all individuals are integrated into a large kinship group called a clan.8 
Paradoxically, this clanic organization does not require any authority. There is no need for a 
family chief to decide who is allowed to marry whom, since couple formation is only the result 
of the traditional practice of cousin marriage. Conversely, in the Stem or Communitarian 
types, the parents are required to give their consent when a child brings a spouse into the 
parental household. In the “Arab marriage”, however, the choice of the spouse by this custom 
transforms fathers and uncles into passive executors of rules. There is no active authority but 
a passive execution. As a consequence, the Arab family is not characterized by either parental 
or purely paternal authority. 
 
B. High status of women9 
In Western countries, the status of women is relatively high. According to the Roman 
(Justinian) legal system, girls enjoyed similar rights to boys regarding inheritance; most of 
the time, a daughter received her share of inheritance at marriage as a dowry (not to be 
confused with a bride price paid by a groom or his family). The Catholic Church imposed the 
free consent of the bride. Women are active agents participating in society; for example, in 
large areas of Europe, there was an active labor market for women before the industrial 
revolution (De Moor and Van Zanden, 2009). Conversely, in countries characterized by the 
tradition of the “Arab marriage”, the status of women, was, and is still low. A woman can be 
excluded from any contact with society exterior to the clan (whereas non-Arab marriage 
requires a minimum of random matching). She can be married very young if she already has 
a male cousin, and the new family do not need financial independence to settle because the 
clan provides resources.  
In sub-Saharan Africa, polygyny is very prevalent, with few differences according to religious 
affiliation. In these countries, polygyny is not limited to a minority of wealthy men as in most 
Arab countries. In black Africa, the percentage of women living in polygamous unions varies 
 
8 Greif (2006, 2013) highlights the consequences of clanic organization, as opposed to the individualism of 
European family structures. This effect of the family model on the way humans cooperate (clan versus groups 
of individuals) is complementary to our approach. But the current paper only focuses on the effects of family 
structures on productivity. 
9 Of course, the status of women was still low compared to men in these countries. But the point is that the 
status of women was even lower in the traditional families of the other group of countries. 
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from 30 to 55% (Todd, 2011: 42). Comparing these African countries to a similar group of 
monogamous countries, Tertilt (2005) concludes that women in polygynous countries marry, 
on average, 5.1 years earlier than women in monogamous countries. The average age difference 
between husband and wife, a traditional indicator of women’s status, is 6.4 years, compared 
to only 2.8 years in monogamous countries. Thus, the status of women in African countries 
is clearly low. The traditional family types in China and most of India also result in low 
status of women, leading to current observation of the famous “missing women” (Sen, 1990); 




FIGURE II. HIGH STATUS OF WOMEN 
Note: This figure shows the countries (in black) where family type includes relatively high status for women. 
 
C. Inequality among siblings 
Potential inequality of siblings is found in Northern Europe both in German and English 
families. But in the German case (as also in the Scandinavian, Austrian, Japanese, Korean or 
Swiss cases), this inequality is associated with parental authority (Stem family) whereas in 
England (as in Denmark and the Netherlands) the children enjoy more freedom (Absolute 
Nuclear type in Todd’s classification). Many inheritances are actually egalitarian, but it is 
not forbidden to transmit the wealth in an inegalitarian way. The freedom to testate is 
evidence of this potential inequality. The English family model was exported by immigrants 
to the USA, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and less clearly to South Africa. In most of the 
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countries of South-East Asia, there are no rules forbidding unequal transmission. These 
countries are therefore also characterized by cases of inequality in inheritance. 
In the rest of the world, strict equality is required, at least among brothers. Brothers in the 
Muslim world are all strictly equal, as stated in the Koran. Russia and China are also 
egalitarian in terms of inheritance, as they are in terms of the possibility of each son to bring 
a wife into the parental home. Latin Europe is also egalitarian, as was the Roman law. Latin 
America, following the Iberian colonizers, adopted the rule of equality. This has been 
reinforced by the adoption of French civil law, in which this equality is clearly affirmed. The 
potential effect when combined with legal origin is tested below.    
 
 
FIGURE III. POTENTIAL INEQUALITY AMONG SIBLINGS 
Note: This figure shows the countries (in black) where family type includes potential inequality among 
siblings. 
 
D. Family score 
Adding the three series of dummy variables, we build for each country a family score ranging 
from 0 to 3. A few countries obtain a 3. They are the Germanic and Scandinavian countries, 
Ireland, Israel and in Asia, Japan and the two Koreas. With two positive family 
characteristics, another small group of countries achieves a 2. England, and thus the Anglo-
Saxon countries, are in this case (they are characterized by high status of women and 
inequality among siblings) as well as a few other European countries such as Finland and the 
Baltic States. Most of the countries of East Asia are also characterized by a 2 (high status of 
women and inequality). A large group of countries enjoy only one positive characteristic, high 
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status of women for Latin Europe and Latin America, parental authority for Eastern Europe, 
Russia, China and India. Another large group of countries gets a zero. This is the case of 
most of the Muslim and African countries.  
 
 
FIGURE IV. FAMILY SCORE ACCORDING TO THE PROPENSITY TO INVEST  
Note: This figure shows the family score obtained by each country from 0 in pale grey to 3 in black. 
 
VI. EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE FAMILY EXPLANATION OF CURRENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
A. Are family characteristics statistically associated with economic development? 
To test the effect of family characteristics on current economic development controlling for 
other fundamental factors, we run this kind of regression:  
 
ln  ∝ 
 
   
        (1) 
 
where yi is the income per capita of country i in the year 2000, Fi is a series measuring a 
family characteristic (‘authority’, ‘women’, ‘inequality’) or the ‘family score’ of the country i, 







TABLE I. FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
  
Note: This table establishes the significant relationship between observed family characteristics and log GDP 
per capita in 2000 in the full 177-country sample. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level and * Significant at the 
10 percent level. 
 
Table I shows the result of unconditional OLS regressions of log income per capita in 2000 on 
the four ‘family’ series. Each of these series appears positively and significantly associated 
with current economic development on a full sample of 177 countries with data. Each of the 
three family series captures different effects, because they remain significant when tested 
altogether (Column 4). The cross correlation between the three characteristics is limited (0.47 
between Inequality and Women, 0.10 between Women and Authority and 0.22 between 
Authority and Inequality). The three series are also significant when summed in the ‘family 
score’ series (Column 5). The relationship between the family score and GDP per capita is 
presented graphically in Figure I. All countries enjoying a family score of 3 are among the 
richest in the world except North Korea where the high propensity to development has not 
expressed itself, probably due to the socialist regime. On the other hand, countries recording 
a 0 family score are poor, except for oil producers. 
 
 









Observations 177 177 177 177 177
R2 0.28 0.06 0.17 0.33 0.32





FIGURE V. FAMILY SCORE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Note: This figure shows the positive relationship between family score and GDP per capita across 177 
countries. 
 
B. Is the family explanation robust to geography? 
Apart from family characteristics, countries are subject to different geographical conditions 
that have been identified in the literature as helping explain current income. Following Ashraf 
and Galor (2013), we control for different geographic factors. An agronomical index gauging 
the overall land suitability for agriculture and the percentage of arable land are frequently 
significant, while the absolute latitude never is (Table II, Column 1). The mean distance to 
waterways (which affects the cost of exchange) is always significantly associated with lower 
economic development. The risk of malaria is highly significant in most of our specifications, 
confirming it as a heavy burden unfavorable to economic development (Gallup and Sachs, 
2001). By comparison, the percent of population living in the tropical zone, and thus suffering 
from other associated diseases, is not correlated with economic development. Unsurprisingly, 
a dummy variable for countries belonging to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) is significantly associated with a higher GDP per capita. 
According to Diamond (1997), the main factor explaining divergence in economic development 
is a favorable environment for agriculture centuries ago, which is confirmed in a global sample 
by Olsson and Paik (2019). But our test finds no statistical link between time since Neolithic 
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transition and current economic development.10 Finally, we also control for geographical 
isolation, as Ashraf and Galor (2010) demonstrate the advantage of a location avoiding 
invasions and roaming bandits; an effect confirmed in our investigation (Column 3).11 
As our family score is partially correlated to continents, with most African countries in 
particular returning a zero, the family score could be just a proxy for the continents. We thus 
control using a dummy for each continent (Column 2). This also enables us to control for the 
Eurasian effect since according to Diamond (1997), the Asian and European continents each 
benefited from specific advantages. No one continental dummy is significant (non-reported). 
Crucially, our family score remains highly significant using all combinations of geographic 
factors with, or without, continent dummies. The sign is as expected, i.e. the higher the family 
score, the more the country is economically developed. This combination of geographic factors 
and the effect of family structures explain a large part of the differences in current GDP per 
capita with an R2 of 0.64 (Column 1). 
 
C. Adding controls for the nature of peoples 
Recent literature identifies three factors explaining the differences we observe in economic 
development related to the nature of peoples. The first is the ethnic fractionalization that we 
control for using the index of ethnic diversity proposed by Alesina et al. (2003). A second 
control is the index of genetic diversity developed by Ashraf and Galor (2013). Our last 
control is the share of population from European descent. This factor could be problematic 
because it is correlated with our family score. Europeans could have brought with them their 
family structure which, on average, scores higher than the rest of the world. However, we use 
this factor as control because Europeans could also have brought with them other inputs as 
well as family structure which then spread throughout the country. To control for these 
factors, we combine them (all together and independently) with the geographic factors 
previously used (Table II, Columns 4 to 8).  
The family score remains significant at 1% when controlling for the three human factors taken 
together with and without dummies for continents (Columns 4 and 5). The ethnic 
fractionalization and the share of European descent are confirmed as significant with the 
expected sign, but genetic diversity is only significant when continents are not controlled for 
(Column 4). However, as will be demonstrated later in this article, both ethnic and genetic 
diversity are often significant when taken together, meaning that they capture complementary 
factors.  
 
10 We use the “Neolithic transition timing (ancestry adjusted)” series from Ashraf and Galor (2013). For 
convenience of interpretation, we have divided these values by 1,000. 
11 Due to the reduced number of observations of this factor, we leave it aside in the following investigations. 
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The family score is also significant at 1% when controlling for each human factor 
independently (Columns 6, 7 and 8). Our family score therefore captures other features than 
ethnic diversity, genetic diversity or the share of European ancestors. This is important for 
the share of European ancestors since Europeans brought with them several things alongside 
their family systems; our family score is not just a proxy for the share of European ancestors, 
because both series are significant when combined (Column 8).  
This specification combining all geographic and human factors explains 72% of GDP per 
capita worldwide. The R2 of the regression does not rise when controlling for continents, but 
the coefficient of the family score increases slightly (Columns 4 and 5). Consequently, to keep 
a parsimonious model, we will not use these continental dummies in the following 
specifications. 
 
D. Robustness checks for countries with various family types and for GDP in 1950 
Our measures could be biased by the choice to affect the dominant family type to a country 
characterized by different family systems. Indeed, 28 countries, such as Italy or the US, 
support a range of family types. We therefore control for this simplification by running our 
regression again but on a sub-sample excluding countries with different family types.12 We 
focus on the most interesting specification, which includes all the control variables excepting 
the percentage of the population of European descent, since this could capture a share of the 
family score. The family score remains highly significant with a stable coefficient (Table II, 
Column 9), so we can conclude that the simplification of affecting the dominant family type 
to a country is not problematic.13 
Our last control is for the economic development observed in the past rather than in 2000. 
As explained variable, we switch to the GDP per capita in 1950 as provided by the updated 
Maddison database (Bolt and Van Zanden, 2014). The number of observations is lower, but 
the family score remains highly significant (Table II, Column 10). In our theoretical 
framework, the family characteristics we focus on have a positive effect on current economic 
development but not necessarily on development centuries ago (especially when human 
capital was not a crucial factor). Thus, it does not make sense to test this theory using age-





12 The countries excluded because of the presence of several family types are Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, 
Costa-Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Israel, Italy, Madagascar, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, United 
Kingdom, United States and Venezuela. 
13 See Rijpma and Carmichael (2016) for a discussion of such a simplification. 
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TABLE II. FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
CONTROLLED FOR GEOGRAPHY AND NATURE OF PEOPLES 
 
 
Note: This table demonstrates the significant relationship between observed family score and log GDP per capita 
in 2000 (in 1950 in Column 9) controlling for geographic and human factors in samples of countries for which 
data are available. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 
1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level and * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
VII. EXPLORING THE CHANNELS OF THE FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS EFFECTS 
A. Family characteristics that help explain current GDP per capita 
In addition to the result of the overall family score, one might wonder which characteristics 
of the family system are the most closely related to income per capita. We therefore use basic 
family characteristics as explanatory variables, retaining as geographical control variables 
in 1950
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Family score 0.42*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.39*** 0.43*** 0.27*** 0.40*** 0.34***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Log percentage of arable -0.08 -0.10 -0.12 -0.18** -0.17** -0.09 -0.16* -0.13* -0.23*** -0.03
  land (0.07) (0.07) (0.18) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12)
Log absolute 0.04 0.01 0.78* -0.12 -0.09 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.17 0.15
  latitude (0.11) (0.11) (0.41) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.19)
Log land suitability for -0.15** -0.16** -0.26** -0.14** -0.15** -0.16** -0.09 -0.17** -0.08 -0.11
  agriculture (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11)
Mean distance to -0.38*** -0.28** -0.30 -0.28** -0.30** -0.33** -0.41*** -0.32** -0.46*** -0.38*
  nearest waterway (0.14) (0.14) (0.24) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.20)
% of pop. at risk of -1.50*** -1.46*** -1.91*** -1.09*** -1.06*** -1.30*** -1.72*** -1.20*** -1.44*** -1.37***
  contracting malaria (0.21) (0.24) (0.49) (0.24) (0.25) (0.22) (0.24) (0.22) (0.26) (0.32)
% of pop. living 0.01 0.18 0.49 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.42
  in tropical zones (0.24) (0.26) (0.58) (0.25) (0.27) (0.24) (0.27) (0.23) (0.30) (0.42)
OPEC 0.40* 0.46** 0.13 0.56*** 0.58*** 0.47** 0.38* 0.50** 0.58** -0.12
  member (0.23) (0.22) (0.38) (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) (0.29)
Log neolithic transition -0.01 0.02 0.14** 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.04
  (ancestry adjusted) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Geographical 0.33***
   isolation (0.07)
Ethnic -0.91*** -0.94*** -0.79*** -1.02*** 0.25
  fractionalization (0.27) (0.28) (0.30) (0.34) (0.40)
Genetic 172* 140 199** 431** -205
  diversity (88.6) (101) (97.8) (173) (126)
Genetic diversity -119* -96.9 -135* -295** 153*
  squared (62.6) (71.2) (69.2) (120) (89.2)
% of pop. of European 0.95*** 1.43** 0.98***
  descent (0.19) (0.56) (0.195)
Continent fixed effect No Yes No No Yes No No No No No
Observations 145 145 69 145 145 145 145 145 117 135
R2 0.64 0.70 0.53 0.72 0.71 0.65 0.65 0.69 0.69 0.51
 in 2000
log income per capita 
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only those previously identified as significant.14 As control for the nature of peoples, we retain 
genetic and ethnic diversity.  
 
TABLE III. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND BASIC FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Note: This table demonstrates the significant relationship between observed basic family characteristics and log 
GDP per capita in 2000, controlling for geographic and human factors in a 145-country sample for which data 
are available. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 
percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level and * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Among the basic family characteristics, high status of women and inequality among siblings 
are highly significant when taken alone (Table III, Columns 1 and 4) and when the three 
family characteristics are combined (Column 5). Conversely, the authority of parents over 
children is not significant (Columns 2 and 5). However, as will be demonstrated below, strong 
 
14 Due to the limited number of observations, we were obliged to retain a low number of explanatory variables. 
We thus exclude absolute latitude, the percentage of the population living in tropical areas and the years since 
the Neolithic transition as well as continent dummies, since they were never significant in any of the previous 
specifications.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Women 0.87*** 0.59***
(0.16) (0.17)




Legal origin -0.611*** -0.40**
  socialist (0.1925) (0.18)
Log percentage of arable -0.15** -0.16** -0.15* -0.20** -0.17**
  land (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Log land suitability for -0.12* -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07
  agriculture (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Mean distance to -0.26* -0.52*** -0.36** -0.44** -0.20
  nearest waterway (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14)
% of pop. at risk of -1.33*** -1.60*** -1.68*** -1.63*** -1.50***
  contracting malaria (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18)
OPEC 0.47** 0.33 0.32 0.38* 0.45**
  member (0.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21)
Ethnic -0.89*** -0.98*** -0.95*** -0.77*** -0.78***
  fractionalization (0.29) (0.32) (0.31) (0.29) (0.27)
Genetic 234*** 241** 264*** 195** 195**
  diversity (84.2) (93.8) (91.1) (83.7) (83.7)
Genetic diversity -159*** -168** -184** -131** -131**
  squared (59.4) (66.1) (64.2) (59.0) (59.0)
Observations 145 145 145 145 145
R2 0.68 0.61 0.63 0.71 0.71




parental authority plays a highly significant positive role in explaining investment in human 
capital. These paradoxical results can be explained by the fact that countries where parental 
authority is strong are also frequently associated with a socialist legal system (correlation 
coefficient of 0.57).15 The potential development of these countries was thus hampered by the 
socialist policies applied for decades before the year 2000 when GDP per capita was measured. 
For the purpose of control, we add a dummy for socialist legal systems which led the parental 
authority series to become slightly significant with a strong increase of its coefficient (Column 
3).  
 
B. The effects of family characteristics on investment in human and physical capital 
A second way to assess the channels of the effects of family characteristics consists in studying 
their relationship with proxies for investment in both human and physical capital in each 
country. Our theoretical framework assumes that high status of women and strong parental 
authority favor investment in human capital. We proxy the investment in human capital 
through the number of scientific articles per capita (1981-2000) and the number of years of 
schooling (the two series are from Ashraf and Galor, 2013).  
Our ‘women’ series correlates significantly with both the number of scientific articles and the 
years of schooling after control for geographical and human factors (Table IV, Columns 1 and 
5). Our ‘authority’ variable is only significant in explaining the number of years of schooling 
(Columns 6). But as previously explained, authority is highly correlated with a socialist legal 
origin; controlling for this characteristic, the authority series becomes also significant 
explaining the number of scientific articles (Column 3). Both a high status of women and a 
strong authority of parents have a positive impact on investment in human capital, but in 
different ways, since the two series are significant when tested together to explain scientific 
articles and years of schooling (Columns 4 and 7).  
To investigate the theoretical positive effect of inequality of siblings on the investment in 
physical capital, we collect (from the Penn World Table, Feenstra et al., 2015), the share of 
gross capital formation and the capital stock amount that we combine with population to get 
a per capita figure. These data have been constituted for each country for the year 2000 and 
are assumed to be good measures of the investment in physical capital. The theoretical 
positive effect of inequality is verified since this series is highly significant in explaining these 




15 According to Todd (1983), the family structure influences political outcomes; when authority of parents is 




TABLE IV. FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS AND INVESTMENTS  
IN HUMAN AND PHYSICAL CAPITAL 
 
Note: This table demonstrates the significant relationship between observed basic family characteristics and 
investments in human (scientific articles per capita and years of schooling) and physical capital (share of capital 
and capital per capita) in samples of countries for which data are available. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level 
and * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
VIII. CONTROLLING FOR RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND FORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
A. Is family structure different from religious affiliation? 
One might expect family characteristics to merely be a consequence of religious affiliation. In 
fact, there are three kinds of relationships between the two phenomena. In some areas, the 
religion did influence the family structure but in others, religion and the family type observed 
are completely independent of one another. And in some cases, influence is in the opposite 
direction (i.e. the family structures have influenced the religion).  
share of capital
capital per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Women 0.24*** 0.22*** 3.14*** 6.11***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.51) (0.47)
Authority 0.02 0.14*** 0.14*** 2.01*** 1.86***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.50) (0.42)
Inequality 0.03** 1.12***
(0.02) (0.18)
Socialist legal -0.25*** -0.22***
  origin (0.05) (0.04)
Log percentage of arable 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 -0.16 -0.03 -0.01 -0.21**
  land (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.24) (0.26) (0.22) (0.01) (0.09)
Log land suitability for -0.06*** -0.04* -0.03 -0.04** -0.10 0.27 -0.03 0.00 -0.05
  agriculture (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.23) (0.24) (0.21) (0.01) (0.08)
Mean distance to 0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.08** 1.58*** 0.61 1.51*** -0.02 -0.43***
  nearest waterway (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.47) (0.48) (0.43) (0.01) (0.16)
% of pop. at risk of -0.06 -0.13** -0.16*** -0.08* -3.29*** -4.22*** -2.73*** -0.04** -2.12***
  contracting malaria (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.63) (0.64) (0.59) (0.02) (0.21)
OPEC -0.10 -0.16* -0.15** -0.10 -1.55** -1.76** -1.09 0.02 0.41
  member (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.74) (0.80) (0.69) (0.02) (0.27)
Ethnic -0.13* -0.15 -0.12 -0.11 -0.54 -0.31 -0.19 -0.07** -0.43
  fractionalization (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (1.06) (0.95) (0.80) (0.03) (0.36)
Genetic 33.7 38.5 47.6** 40.23* 1022** 491* 528** 14.7* 312***
  diversity (23.2) (26.1) (23.9) (21.4) (420) (276) (233) (8.63) (104)
Genetic diversity -22.3 -26.7 -33.1* -26.9* -705** -341* -360** -10.4* -216***
  squared (16.4) (18.5) (16.9) (15.1) (293) (195) (165) (6.09) (73.6)
Observations 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 133 133
R2 0.34 0.23 0.31 0.45 0.63 0.56 0.69 0.28 0.71




The influence of religion on the family seems clear for Islam, as the Koran provides a complete 
set of rules for organizing the family. According to Todd (2011: 30), the populations of North 
Africa were converted to their current family type at the same time as they were converted 
to Islam and then to the Arabic language. Equally, the Catholic Church would be the main 
explanation for the high status of west European women according to De Moor and van 
Zanden (2009) and, more broadly, the cause of several psychological traits observed in the 
west due to its family policy (Schulz et al., 2019).  
But there are also many cases of independence between religion and the family structure. 
Despite being Muslim, Albanians remain exogamic with few marriages between cousins 
(Todd, 2011: 467). In contrast, the Christians of Bayreuth (Lebanon) are frequently married 
to their cousins (about 10% of marriages). Despite being Christians, the status of women in 
Georgia and Armenia is very low even today, as demonstrated by the sex ratio observed in 
2000 which is respectively 118 and 120 boys for 100 girls due to selective abortion (Todd, 
2011: 487). The most demonstrative case of independence between religion and family 
structure is South-East Asia. Most of the inhabitants of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Java share the same family type whether they are Muslims, 
Christians or Buddhists. 
A third form of relationship is the influence of a preexisting family structure on the religion 
adopted. Sometimes, a religion became dominant in areas where specific family types already 
existed. For example in Europe, Protestantism mainly succeeded where the Stem family was 
dominant (combination of ‘authority’ and ‘inequality’) according to Todd (1984: 256).16 For 
Todd (2011), the family type promoted by the Catholic Church was a consequence of a 
preexisting family model (and not an exogeneous doctrine as assumed by Schulz et al., 2019); 
this direction of causality rebuts the criticism that, despite common texts, all Christians did 
not favor the same family model. According to Todd (1984), except in North-Africa, Islam 
became the dominant religion mainly where the “Arab marriage” was already present because 
the family rules laid down by the Koran are compatible with this family organization. For 
instance, the low status of women precedes Islam in a large part of the current “Arab world”, 
as attested by the fact that girls were fully excluded from inheritance even before Islamization. 
According to Islamic law, girls inherit a smaller share than boys but, in many places, this 
rule is not respected with a total exclusion of girls, contradicting the Koran.17  
Family structure as a consequence of religion is only one of three cases of potential relations. 
In this case, religion would be the fundamental factor of economic development reducing the 
family characteristics to a simple channel; Religion → Family Characteristics → Economic 
development. Besides, if family type causes religious affiliation, religion could be a channel of 
 
16 Protestants relaxed the Catholic ideal of free consent to marriage (the marriage is not a sacrament in the 
Protestant doctrine) granting a role to parents, which is a necessary practice in the Stem family. 
17 The Shiite version of the law is more favorable to daughters (Todd, 2011: 487). 
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its effect through, for instance, the development of specific cultural traits highlighted by 
Schulz et al. (2019); Family characteristics → Religion → Economic development. In these 
two cases, the effect of family characteristics on economic development through propensity 
to invest could be inoperant. We thus control for the share of the three main religions in the 
population of each country to check whether the religious affiliation is not the main driver of 
our observations as fundamental cause or as an intermediate channel.  
 
TABLE V. FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
CONTROLLED FOR RELIGION 
 
Note: This table demonstrates that the effect of family characteristics on GDP per capita do not operate through 
religious affiliation in a sample of 143 countries for which data are available. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level 
and * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)








% of pop 0.77*** 0.49** 0.68*** 0.81***
  Catholic (0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.19)
% of pop 0.06 -0.14 -0.31 -0.11
  Muslim (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) (0.22)
% of pop 0.91*** 0.90*** 1.10*** 0.76**
  Protestant (0.32) (0.33) 0.34** (0.31)
Log percentage of arable -0.19** -0.12* -0.09 -0.06 -0.12*
  land (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Log land suitability for -0.08 -0.15* -0.18** -0.19** -0.15**
  agriculture (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Mean distance to -0.37* -0.32** -0.29** -0.41*** -0.36***
  nearest waterway (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
% of pop at risk of -1.40*** -1.42*** -1.47*** -1.61*** -1.64***
  contracting malaria (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.15)
OPEC 0.48** 0.47** 0.47** 0.41* 0.39**
  member (0.22) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19)
Ethnic -0.71*** -0.59** -0.68** -0.67** -0.53**
  fractionalization (0.29) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.26)
Genetic 134.7 236*** 269*** 296*** 217***
  diversity (86.5) (82.8) (84.3) (86.7) (80.3)
Genetic diversity -90.4 -162*** -184*** -205*** -147**
  squared (61.1) (58.4) (59.5) (61.1) (56.7)
Observations 143 143 143 143 143
R2 0.68 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.75
 in 2000
log income per capita 
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We run regressions similar to the previous one but with a lower number of observations 
(Table V, Column 1) to match the countries where data about religious affiliation are 
available. For each country, we then add the share of the population which is Protestant, 
Catholic and Muslim (Column 2). Columns 2 to 5 show that Catholicism and Protestantism 
are positively and significantly associated with economic development in all specifications, 
whereas Islam is mostly negative but never significant. We obtain an indication about the 
importance of the religious channel compared to the direct effect of family characteristics by 
looking at how β1 of the family score changes when controlling for religious affiliations. The 
coefficient of the family score decreases by about one fifth after control for religion, attesting 
that part of the influence of the family system is confounded with religion. But the family 
score remains highly significant (Column 2), demonstrating the religion and family 
characteristics are fully independent of one another. Turning to the impact of basic 
characteristics, both high status of women and inequality among siblings are robust to the 
inclusion of religious affiliations, but strong parental authority is not. Overall, we demonstrate 
that the family characteristics we identify as theoretically favorable, even if often close to 
religious affiliation, have an independent and positive influence on economic development.  
 
B. Is the effect of family structure through investment or does it operate via formal 
institutions? 
Family structure could have influenced a society to build specific formal institutions. This 
idea goes back to Aristotle, explaining the prevalence of the monarchies at his time by the 
fact that each human is used to this form of government in his own family with his father as 
king.18 Galasso and Profeta (2010) provide evidence of this kind of phenomenon. In this case 
the effect of the family structure would be intermediated through formal institutions rather 
than through its effect on propensity to invest; Family characteristics → Formal institutions 
→ Economic development. 
We run our regressions again using the global family score (Table VI, Column 1) and then 
the three basic characteristics (Column 3) but with a lower number of observations to match 
the institutional data available (108 observations). In columns 2 and 4, we add a measure of 
the quality of institutions (social infrastructure index of Hall and Jones, 1999). The 
coefficients of our family series strongly decrease, meaning that a part of their explanatory 
power acts through the quality of the institutions but remains highly significant. When basic 
characteristics are tested, only high status of women remains significant after controlling for 
institutional quality. The fact that the global family score and high status of women remain 
significant after controlling for the quality of institutions supports our theory of an effect on 
productivity through propensity to invest and not only through better formal institutions, 
 
18 Aristotle, Politics, in his introduction and in Part XIII. 
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even if this channel is also at work. This also offers a control for the ability of individuals to 
cooperate on a non-family basis. 
Another set of controls is for legal origin, since this institutional feature has been identified 
as explaining differences in economic development (La Porta et al., 2008). For many countries, 
especially in Europe and for countries that have freely chosen a legal regime (like Latin 
America for the French civil law or several countries for a socialist regime), the legal regime 
could also be the result of such fundamental factors as family characteristics. Of course, for 
countries that inherited their institutions from colonizers (Acemoglu et al., 2001), the origin 
of the current legal system is unrelated to their family structures.  
We run our classical regressions using the overall family score (Column 5) and the three 
family characteristics (Column 7) but with more countries than in the previous investigations. 
We then add a dummy for the British, French and socialist legal origins.19 British and French 
legal origins do not have a significant effect, but a socialist origin is significantly associated 
with lower economic development. The parental authority variable remains nonsignificant 
whereas our family score, the high status of women and the inequality of siblings remain 
strongly significant with only a modest decrease of their coefficients, meaning that the legal 
origin variable is a very limited channel, if any, for the impact of family characteristics. 
Finally, Borcan et al. (2018) point out the hump-shaped relationship between economic 
development and state history. For these authors, the oldest-established states currently 
suffer low productivity due to accumulated over-centralization, while very young states are 
unable to offer sufficient fiscal and institutional capacity. Middle-aged states offer the 
appropriate context for economic growth. The effect of state history could be an alternative 
rationale to account for economic development or, as explained below, a companion outcome 
of family structure, as these two characteristics could result from a common diffusion of 
innovations from the earliest areas of civilization. Our family score (Column 9) as well as high 
status of women and potential inequality among siblings (Column 10) return approximately 










19 We do not use the German and Scandinavian legal origin due to the insufficient number of cases. 
20 We use the data “statehiste00” from the Borcan et al. (2018) database. Values are divided by 10,000 for 
convenience of presentation. 
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TABLE VI. FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
CONTROLLED FOR FORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
Note: This table demonstrates that the effect of family characteristics on GDP per capita does not operate 
through quality of formal institutions and legal origins for samples of countries for which data are available. 
The effects of family characteristics are also robust to the state history of each country. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 
5 percent level and * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
IX. THE DIRECTION OF CAUSALITY: THE REVERSAL OF FORTUNE OF THE PRIMITIVE FAMILY 
A. Historical anthropology shows that family systems predate economic development 
One could ask whether the correlation we have demonstrated between family characteristics 
and economic development is not due to a reverse causality in which the economic 
development causes specific family characteristics. This potential reverse causality can easily 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Family score 0.53*** 0.26*** 0.40*** 0.43*** 0.402***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.0814)
Women 0.63*** 0.47*** 0.58*** 0.57*** 0.54***
(0.17) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20)
Authority 0.20 0.15 -0.05 0.06 -0.07
(0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.20) (0.15)
Inequality 0.67*** 0.18 0.59*** 0.46** 0.63***
(0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.19) (0.16)
Social 1.85*** 1.85***
  infrastructure (0.27) (0.28)
French legal -0.06 -0.29
  origin (0.30) (0.32)
UK legal -0.10 -0.30
  origin (0.30) (0.31)
Socialist legal -0.63** -0.61**
  origin (0.28) (0.28)
State -2.95 -1.74
   history (2.01) (2.12)
State history 0.00 0.00
  squared (0.00) (0.00)
Log percentage of arable -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.19*** -0.19** -0.17** -0.18** -0.17** -0.11 -0.10
  land (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Log land suitability for -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 -0.06 -0.10 -0.08
  agriculture (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Mean distance to -0.29 -0.26* -0.29 -0.24 -0.37*** -0.21 -0.30** -0.22 -0.32** -0.26*
  nearest waterway (0.19) (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
% of pop. at risk of -1.30*** -0.98*** -1.26*** -0.91*** -1.35*** -1.50*** -1.46*** -1.51*** -1.47*** -1.57***
  contracting malaria (0.19) (0.16) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.25)
OPEC 0.25 0.34** 0.24 0.36** 0.49** 0.45** 0.45** 0.45** 0.47** 0.41*
  member (0.18) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.23)
Ethnic -0.57** -0.64*** -0.65** -0.65** -0.79*** -0.75*** -0.78*** -0.71** -0.87*** -0.83***
  fractionalization (0.27) (0.22) (0.27) (0.22) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.30) (0.30)
Genetic 261*** 211*** 253*** 224*** 161* 199** 170** 197** 107 119
  diversity (73.1) (60.9) (73.7) (61.6) (86.2) (84.3) (84.2) (84.5) (79.1) (80.9)
Genetic diversity -180*** -146*** -174*** -154*** -109* -135** -114* -133** -71.1 -77.8
  squared (51.8) (43.1) (52.1) (43.6) (60.8) (59.5) (59.4) (59.6) (56.3) (57.6)
Observations 108 108 108 108 145 145 145 145 140 140.000
R2 0.82 0.88 0.83 0.88 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.72




be rejected by investigating the history of family structures. To study the long-term history 
of family structures, anthropologists examined a variety of evidence. This deep analysis is 
facilitated when documents are available such as old codes (starting with the Code of 
Hammurabi, which deals with many aspects of family life) and contracts; especially sales 
agreements, because we can observe whether sales of properties after death of parents include 
all siblings or one specific heir to assess inequality among siblings, and whether the wife signs 
with her husband to indicate the status of women.  
The lack of written records means that other types of evidence are required. For example, 
the genetic kinship of male and female human remains exhibits the matri, patri or bilocality 
of family settlements, testifying to the status of women. Statues of women can also be used 
to assess the status of women according to their number, the importance of the decorations 
compared to those of men and the activities represented. Similar observations are obtained 
from tombs. Inequality among siblings can also be supported by family portraits where one 
of them is given greater importance.  
Reverse causality (i.e. from economic development to family structures) can be rejected by 
the timeline. In most of the countries, the family structures we used in this study had existed 
for centuries before economic take-off. The family types precede the economic development, 
so the causality should run from family types to economic development. It does not mean 
that family structures are fixed, but they evolve very slowly compared to other institutions 
(Level 1 institutions, according to Williamson, 2000). 
 
B. A reversal of fortune 
The losers of yesterday are the winners of today. Date of first writing (the beginning of 
history) is a good measure of past success. The oldest text in Japanese (the Kojiki) dates only 
from 712 CE. It is even later in non-Romanized Europe: during the 8th century CE for the 
eastern part of Germany (after the conquest by Charlemagne), in the 10th-11th centuries for 
Russia, about one century later for the Scandinavian areas and only during the 13-14th 
centuries for the Baltic countries. These countries clearly lagged way behind Mesopotamia 
(around 3300 BCE) or Egypt (3000 BCE). However, these countries are now incomparably 
wealthier than the winners of yesterday.  
Several explanations have been proposed by scholars studying this reversal: environmental 
degradation (Diamond, 2005), peripheral regions were less exposed to raids by roaming armies 
and to incursions by migrating peoples (Ashraf and Galor, 2010), over-centralization of the 
earliest states (Borcan et al., 2018), and areas where agriculture first arose developed 
autocratic societies driving more individualistic inhabitants to flee and to replace populations 
abroad, leading to the rise of more individualistic societies (favorable for economic 
development) at the margins of Eurasia (Olsson and Paike, 2019).  
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The history of family organizations provides another explanation for this reversal. Areas that 
were backward preserved archaic family forms that are today more supportive of economic 
development while early starters developed new complex family forms that impede modern 
growth. According to Todd (2011), there has been a gradual complexification of family 
structures over time from the Nuclear family to the “Arab marriage” type. The primitive 
form is the Nuclear family observed in England but also in many hunter-gatherer peoples 
(Todd, 2011: 19); a group of Nuclear families in a horde is anthropologically similar to the 
juxtaposition of Nuclear families observed in villages in modern Europe.21 Ancient DNA 
analysis show that Neolithic Europeans families were nuclear (Bentlery et al. 2008; Haak et 
al., 2008). 
Three successive innovations provided stronger ties leading to more complex forms of families. 
From the primitive Nuclear form, the first step of complexity led to the Stem family (parental 
authority and inequality among siblings, since only one married child remains in the parental 
home), then the Communitarian family appeared (parental authority and equality, since all 
the married sons can bring their spouses into the parental household). The third and last 
development is the “Arab marriage” in which the children of two brothers marry one other 
(Todd, 2011: 518). The complexity of family types run from the Nuclear form (one couple), 
to the Stem form (two couples), the Communitarian (more than two couples) and the “Arab 
family” (a clan of numerous couples). Of course, this constitutes an oversimplification 
omitting variations on these types such as the exact status of women in each local version. 
Although the long-term history of family systems follows this scheme, this gradual 
complexification is not only time-dependent. Environmental constraints and opportunities 
can favor a given development. For instance, the evolution toward the Stem family (only one 
of the offspring inherits the farm) appears only in a context of limited land resources. 
Regarding this aspect, the gradual complexification of family structures can be 
complementary to the functionalist approach, which claims that responses to ecological 
constraints explain family features such as the strength of family ties (Alger and Weibull, 
2010), polygyny prevalence (Alger, 2015) and low status of women (through plow agriculture, 
see Alesina et al., 2013). 
Regarding our basic family characteristics, complexification tends to decrease women’s status 
(a stronger affiliation to the husband’s family occurs at the expense of the affiliation to the 
woman’s family, thus leading to reduced status of women), which in turn reduces investment 
in human capital, which is crucial nowadays. This effect is deeply investigated by Carmichael 
 
21 Status of women for instance is relatively high in hunter-gatherer societies (Hansen et al. 2015). Ancient DNA 




et al., 2019.22 Complexification also implies increasing egalitarian rules among siblings (to be 
sustainable, a large family requires equality among siblings) thus reducing the amount and 
quality of investment in physical capital. Concerning parental authority, the effect of 
complexification is not linear, with an increase of the authority in the first two steps of 
complexification before a fall in the ultimate evolution, the “Arab marriage”. Overall, we can 
assume that the more primitive the family system, the higher its family score. 
There is therefore no one family type that is universally better, but according to the context, 
the characteristics of one family type can be an advantage or a handicap. An interesting 
illustration concerns industrialization. The English family, characterized by freedom of 
children (and potential inequality), is better for the launch of the industrial revolution as 
each younger generation was free (no attachment to the parental household nor automatic 
inheritance) to seek work in the new industrializing cities looking for unqualified labor. Young 
English people could easily move away from their family’s property as the separation of 
children from parents was the norm. Conversely, moving away from the family’s property 
was seen as an unnatural rupture in family systems characterized by authority. At a later 
stage of economic development, however, the economy required more qualified people, and 
technological changes increased the demand for human capital, as assumed for example by 
Doepke and Tertilt (2009). At this stage of development, the German family model became 
better suited because the authority of parents over children staying at home for a longer time 
permitted higher investment in human capital. This could explain the rise of Germany 
compared to England during the second industrial revolution.  
 
C. Instrumental variable test across Eurasia 
In addition to the anthropological evidence provided above for the age-old origin of the family 
system (and thus, the direction of causality), we design an empirical test using an 
instrumental variable. Diamond (1997) provided a large amount of evidence regarding the 
spread of products, technologies and formal institutions across Eurasia after a single original 
invention (agriculture, writing, city, legal code, state, empire, etc.). Todd (2011) assumes the 
same process for the informal institution which is each family model, but at a very slow speed 
consistent with ‘slow moving institutions’ (Williamson, 2000). A higher degree of family 
complexification is invented once and then spreads very slowly through contagion between 
populations; this contagion could be both cultural and genetic.23 The hypothesis of a gradual 
spread of family complexification is also supported by a similar process concerning another 
 
22 Hansen et al. (2015) demonstrate a strong negative association between years since the Neolithic transition 
and status of women, which is also consistent with the ‘complexification of family system’ channel we investigate 
here. 
23 Ancient DNA analysis show a clear decrease of the Neolithic genetic contribution with geographic 
distance from the Near East (Rasteiro and Chikhi, 2013). 
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family-related behavior. The European Fertility Project (Princeton) concluded that declining 
fertility spread gradually across regions in Europe (Lee, 2015). This diffusionist view is 
confirmed by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2014), who found strong relationships between genetic 
and linguistic distance from France (the innovator in terms of declining fertility) and the 
timing of the decline in fertility in a given country. 
In Eurasia, the main innovations appeared independently in two innovative centers: the 
Fertile Crescent and China. Diamond (1997) cited “bio-geographic” advantages to explain 
why these two areas benefited from these innovations. Whatever the reasons, we assume that 
family innovations also emerged in these areas before spreading across Eurasia. This narrative 
is consistent with the presence of the more complex family form (the “Arab marriage”) around 
the Fertile Crescent, while the Stem family was the dominant form in antique Mesopotamia 
(Todd, 2011). Outside the Fertile Crescent, less and less complex family forms are currently 
observed. Countries far from the Fertile Crescent have kept primitive forms of family systems; 
the “conservatism of peripheral areas” is a phenomenon well known in linguistics that Todd 
applies to family models (Todd, 2019: preface). The same is true around China, even if the 
complexification never reached the ultimate level represented by the “Arab marriage”. 
Western Europe and East Asia, due to their peripheral location on the edges of Eurasia, are 
thus conservatories of the archaic forms of family organizations. Figure VI illustrates this 
modeling of the history of family complexification.  
As a consequence, a relevant instrumental variable for measuring the archaism of the family 
type (and thus its family score) of a given country is the distance between its capital city and 
the two centers of innovations (Fertile Crescent and China). This instrument is a rough 
simplification. First, many other factors can accelerate or slow this diffusion (e.g. invasions, 
communication pathways, natural obstacles, language, etc.). Moreover, family score is only 
partially dependent on family archaism because while status of women and potential 
inequality decrease as a result of family innovations, parental authority is the first positive 
innovation. But overall, if the “evolution via contagion” view of family systems is broadly 
true, the greater the distance from the centers of innovation, the more archaic the family 
system should be. Moreover, we have assumed that the more archaic family (high family 
score) models currently enjoy better economic outcomes. Combining these two relationships, 
we assume: Distance from innovations → Family characteristics → Propensity to invest → 
Economic development. 
We focus on Eurasian countries (including neighboring islands such as Japan and the UK) 
because the spreading of a family innovation throughout this landmass is assumed to be as 
easy as for other innovations, whereas other continents are split up by geographical barriers 
such as deserts and seas (Diamond, 1997). Moreover, Eurasia is made up of numerous 
countries, with almost entirely indigenous (for centuries) populations, which avoids the need 
to control for post-1500 migrations. In addition, focusing on Eurasia controls for Diamond’s 
hypothesis that this area enjoyed a specific advantage, due mainly to geography. 
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FIGURE VI. THEORETICAL DIFFUSION OF FAMILY COMPLEXIFICATION 
Note: This scheme shows the theoretical diffusion across Eurasia of the successive innovations leading to 
complexification of family systems from the two centers of innovation, the Fertile Crescent and China. These 
centers introduced innovations that spread through contagion to the rest of the continent. Far from these two 
centers, at the margins of the continent, archaic family systems remain dominant. As a consequence, the further 
away a country is from the centers, the more primitive its family system will be.  
 
To build our instrument, we measure the aerial distances, in thousands of kilometers, between 
the capital city of each country and both Bagdad (heart of the Fertile Crescent) and Xi’an 
(heart of China, site of the famous Terracotta Army of the First Qin emperor). Our 
instrument is the mean of the distances between a capital and these two cities. We use the 
mean rather than the distance from the closest center of innovation because both centers 
diffused their innovations. The closest center is not always the origin of the contagion; for 
instance, according to Todd (2011: 307), the first complexification in Eastern Europe was 
introduced through the Hunnic invasions, i.e. with a Chinese origin, even though the Fertile 
Crescent was closer. Moreover, an area between the two centers, such as Afghanistan, received 
both influences and not only the one from the closest center. These combined effects led to 
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greater complexification for a country between the two centers of innovations; a characteristic 
that the mean distance captures.24 
As an example of our instrument, for Bangladesh, the distances are 4,583 km between Dacca 
and Bagdad and 2,144 km between Dacca and Xi’an. Our instrument, the mean distance from 
these innovation centers, is therefore 3,363 km. For Tokyo the mean distance is 5,571 km. 
We assume that Japan has a more archaic family system than Bangladesh and thus a higher 
family score. 
The average distance from innovation centers is an attractive instrument for testing family 
score because there is no theoretical reason to believe that GDP in 2000 is affected by the 
distance from the Fertile Crescent and China. However, we might expect this distance to 
capture other factors potentially able to explain economic development. Indeed, like the 
family system, the history of the state, the time since the Neolithic transition as well as 
geographical isolation could also be proxied by the distance from the innovation centers. 
Fortunately, these variables are observable, showing that the distance from the innovation 
correlates most closely with the family score (0.63); its correlation with history of state and 
geographical isolation are more limited (-0.35 and 0.32 respectively) while its correlation with 
the time since the Neolithic transition is nil (0.02). Moreover, we control for these alternative 
factors in the following IV investigation.  
In the first stage, we use the mean aerial distance of one country from the centers of 
innovations  to instrument the family score  as follows: 
 ∝ 
 
   
        (2) 
 
where Fi is the family score of the country i,  is the mean distance of the capital city of 
country i from Bagdad and Xi’an, Xi is a vector of control factors and, finally, εi is an error 
term. 




   
      (3) 
 
where yi is the GDP per capita of country i in the year 2000, Fi is the instrumented family 
score of country i obtained from equation (2), Xi is the same vector of control factors and, 
finally, εi is a country-specific disturbance term. 
 
24 As a control, we also run the same exercise but using the distance from the closest center of innovation as 
instrument (see Column 12 of Table VII below). 
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As is evident from the F-statistic of the instrument in the first stage (Table VII), average 
distance from innovation centers is a strong instrument for the family score of a country. This 
distance alone explains 44% of the variation in the family score (Column 1). In the second 
stage, we use the fitted value of the family score instrumented by the mean distance from 
innovation centers to again run our regression explaining GDP per capita in 2000, but for a 
sample limited to 71 Eurasian countries. The instrumented family score (in other words, the 
part of the family score that is due to distance from innovation centers) is highly significant 
in explaining GDP, both alone (Column 7) and with control variables (Column 8). Figure 
VII shows the relationship between GDP per capita and our instrument (mean distance from 
innovation centers).  
 
 
FIGURE VII. MEAN DISTANCE FROM INNOVATION CENTERS  
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Note: This figure depicts the positive impact of the mean distance from innovation centers (Fertile Crescent 
and China) on the GDP per capita across 79 Eurasian countries. 
 
We also run our IV investigation purging in the first stage for the alternative factors that 
could also be captured by the distance from innovation centers. Including geographical 
isolation, our instrumented family score remains significant at 4%, but with a lower 
coefficient; in this sample reduced to 62 observations, geographical isolation appears 
significantly associated with GDP per capita, confirming that this aspect also plays a role 
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(Column 9).25 State antiquity and time since the Neolithic transition appear to have no effect, 
while the instrumented family score remains significant at 1% (Columns 10 and 11).  
For control purposes, we also follow the same process but using as instrument the distance 
from the closest center of innovation (Column 6) rather than the mean distance from the two 
centers. The result using this second instrumental variable confirms the significance of the 
family score but with a lower R squared (Column 12 compared to 8). Finally, it is interesting 
to note that both the coefficients and the Rs squared of the regressions using the instrumental 
variables are higher than was observed using the original family score on the same subsample 
(Column 13).  
TABLE VII. FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EURASIA 
USING AN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE 
 
Note: This table displays an instrumental test of the effect of family score on GDP per capita. In a first stage, 
the family score of a given country is instrumented by the mean distance of its capital city from the two centers 
of innovation (Fertile Crescent and China). In a second stage, the fitted value of the family score is used to 
demonstrate the causal effect of family characteristics on GDP per capita, while controlling for other 
fundamental factors. This analysis was performed on a sample of 71 (or fewer) Eurasian countries for which 
data are available. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 
1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level and * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
25 We do not use the geographical isolation measure in our previous investigations due to the small number of 
observations provided by this dataset. 
Standard
OLS
IV IV IV IV IV IV2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Family score 0.59*** 1.26*** 0.41** 1.47*** 1.50*** 1.78** 0.39***
(0.15) (0.33) (0.19) (0.46) (0.46) (0.85) (0.09)
Average distance from 0.66*** 0.52*** 0.33*** 0.45*** 0.43***
  innovation centers (0.08) (0.13) (0.08) (0.17) (0.15)
Minimum distance to 0.26***
  innovation centers (0.13)
Geographical 0.03 0.39***
  isolation (0.10) (0.10)
State -4.18 2.21
  history (0.00) (9.41)
State history 0.00 0.00
  squared (0.00) (0.00)
Log Neolithic transition -0.16** 0.26
  timing (ancestry adjusted) (0.07) (0.17)
Log percentage of arable 0.02 -0.06 -0.09 0.01 -0.07 -0.09 -0.01 0.10 -0.12 -0.09 -0.14
  land (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) (0.13) (0.16) (0.22) (0.14) (0.31) (0.24) (0.28) (0.17)
Log land suitability for -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 0.03 -0.22 -0.33** -0.11 -0.25 -0.22 -0.20
  agriculture (0.13) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.21) (0.13) (0.26) (0.24) (0.27) (0.13)
Mean distance to -0.25 -0.45** -0.44* -0.27 -0.66*** 0.18 0.05 0.63 0.24 0.63 -0.50*
  nearest waterway (0.16) (0.23) (0.23) (0.17) (0.16) (0.37) (0.25) (0.56) (0.43) (0.79) (0.26)
% of pop. at risk of -0.74 -1.05** -0.60 -0.58 -1.09** -0.36 -1.34** -0.47 -0.48 0.37 -1.52**
  contracting malaria (0.42) (0.46) (0.52) (0.38) (0.45) (0.85) (0.55) (1.04) (0.92) (1.40) (0.70)
OPEC -0.83* -0.54 -0.72 -0.76** -0.66** 1.26* 0.21 1.06 1.25 1.61*** 0.44
  member (0.37) (0.29) (0.43) (0.37) (0.30) (0.71) (0.48) (0.84) (0.79) (1.06) (0.45)
Ethnic -0.25 -0.28 -0.35 -0.26 -0.68 -0.58 -0.73 -0.54 -0.77 -0.37 -1.21**
  fractionalization (0.44) (0.48) (0.50) (0.41) (0.48) (0.71) (0.45) (0.82) (0.77) (0.99) (0.53)
Genetic -202 -27.6 -146 -496 -19.6*** 641 32.3 558.7 1049 46.3 586
  diversity (521) (546) (565) (516) (6.25) (682) (562) (802) (808) (1063) (462)
Genetic diversity 128 4.51 91.1 338.9 -426 -370 -716 -401
  squared (364) (380) (394) (361) (475) (558) (563) (320)
Observations 71 71 68 67 72 71 71 71 62 66 71 71 71
F-test 63.4 8.81 6.75 5.93 8.75 7.03 16.4 14.5 12.0 3.2 3.9 3.19 9.13
R2 0.44 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.52 0.40 0.16 0.63 0.62 0.28 0.29 0.20 0.51
(Family score explained)
First stage Second stage





This paper makes two contributions. First, we introduce three theoretical links from family 
characteristic to economic development through the propensity to invest in both human and 
physical capital. Strong parental authority leads to a higher investment in human capital as 
children remain under parental influence for a longer period. High status of women also 
enables them to invest more in human capital thanks to the crucial role played by the mother 
in the education of children. Inequality among siblings permits greater investment in physical 
capital, as a critical size of wealth is maintained and the grasp of opportunities is not 
discouraged. 
The second contribution of this paper is to test the explanatory power of these theoretical 
effects on the differences we observe in current economic outcomes in the different countries 
across the world. The presence of these favorable characteristics is associated with higher 
GDP per capita. This association is robust to the control for factors previously identified by 
the literature as contributing to comparative development. These family characteristics seem 
to act mainly as a direct effect rather than through the building of better institutions or the 
influence of religions, as the family variable is also robust to controls for both institutions and 
religious affiliation.  
Among the basic characteristics, high status of women and, even if less clearly, parental 
authority are associated with high investment in human capital proxied by scientific articles 
per capita and number of years of schooling. Inequality of siblings is associated with higher 
investment in physical capital as measured in public accounting. The direction of the causality 
from family system to economic development is demonstrated thanks to anthropological 
history and a test using the distance from family innovation centers as instrumental variable.  
Do these findings have consequences in terms of policy recommendations? Here, economic 
development appears to be a consequence of the deep informal institutions represented by 
family characteristics. These informal institutions are very slow moving and, even if 
practically feasible, political decisions to change them could be seen as illegitimate. But, 
maybe changes of family organizations to converge through the one observed in US are already 
ongoing? According to Reher (1998), “changes of this past century have tended to make 
cultures and mentalities more uniform”. There is some evidence of a transmission of 
preferences via television. Chong et al. (2008) find that exposure to soap operas in Brazil led 
to a decrease in fertility. Oster and Jensen (2009) show how attitudes about the status of 
women changed with the arrival of cable television in rural India. Maybe Hollywood movies 
and soap operas have imperceptibly played a crucial role for decades to change family 
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